TrueTop: A Sybil-Resilient System for User Influence Measurement on
  Twitter by Zhang, Jinxue et al.
1TrueTop: A Sybil-Resilient System for User
Influence Measurement on Twitter
Jinxue Zhang, Student Member, IEEE, Rui Zhang, Member, IEEE, Jingchao Sun, Student Member, IEEE,
Yanchao Zhang, Senior Member, IEEE, and Chi Zhang, Member, IEEE
Abstract—Influential users have great potential for accelerating
information dissemination and acquisition on Twitter. How to
measure the influence of Twitter users has attracted significant
academic and industrial attention. Existing influence measure-
ment techniques are vulnerable to sybil users that are thriving
on Twitter. Although sybil defenses for online social networks
have been extensively investigated, they commonly assume unique
mappings from human-established trust relationships to online
social associations and thus do not apply to Twitter where users
can freely follow each other. This paper presents TrueTop, the
first sybil-resilient system to measure the influence of Twitter
users. TrueTop is rooted in two observations from real Twitter
datasets. First, although non-sybil users may incautiously follow
strangers, they tend to be more careful and selective in retweeting,
replying to, and mentioning other users. Second, influential users
usually get much more retweets, replies, and mentions than non-
influential users. Detailed theoretical studies and synthetic simu-
lations show that TrueTop can generate very accurate influence
measurement results with strong resilience to sybil attacks.
Keywords—Influence measurement, social networks, Twitter,
sybil resilience.
I. INTRODUCTION
TWITTER has become a powerful vehicle for large-scaleinformation dissemination. As of May 2014, Twitter has
255 million monthly active users and 500 million daily tweets.
This massive base of active users has triggered explosive uses
of Twitter in marketing, journalism, public relations, massive
information campaigns, entertainment, and during events of
worldwide and national significance.
Influential Twitter users have great potential for accelerating
information dissemination and acquisition. For example, to
launch a viral marketing campaign for a new product via
Twitter, a known strategy is for the marketer to seed the prod-
uct with a few selected influential users who can potentially
influence a disproportionately large number of others and also
quickly trigger a cascade of influence. As another example,
in the event of a national crisis, the governmental authority
can conduct a massive information campaign by disseminating
truthful information via influential users to effectively achieve
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strategic goals and also counteract rumors. As the last example,
to have realtime situational awareness about a physical region
of interest, military agencies can recruit volunteers in the target
region via influential Twitter users there and then outsource the
collection of in-situ information to the volunteers.
The strong promise of influential users leads to the growing
attention on how to measure the influence of a Twitter user
[1]–[4]. There are also over 20 commercial tools available
for measuring twitterers’ online influence. Common to these
research proposals [1]–[4] and commercial tools is to capture
the qualitative feature of online influence as “the ability to
cause effect, change behavior, and drive measurable outcomes
online” [5] and to quantify a twitterer’s online influence based
on his/her interactions with others.
The rise of social bots [6] or sybils [7] in general on Twitter
is jeopardizing trustworthy influence measurement. In a sybil
attack, the adversary coordinates many fake accounts (also
called bots or sybil users hereafter) to unfairly overpower
non-sybil users. Despite various efforts to detect sybil users
on Twitter [8]–[13], sybil users are still thriving on Twitter.
For example, a recent study [14] revealed that at least 10%
of Twitter users are sybil users. Given the exclusive reliance
of existing influence measurement techniques on user interac-
tions, the adversary could coordinate his sybil users to create
arbitrary interactions to inflate their influence scores on Twitter.
Since influence scores are relatively defined, the adversary
could also effectively deflate the influence scores of non-sybil
Twitter users. According to our recent study [15], an adversary
controlling 1,000 sybil users can quickly generate an influence
score in the 95th percentile for any sybil user under popular
influence measurement tools such as Klout [16], Kred [17],
and Retweet Rank [18]. In a similar study [19], Messias et al.
used two social bots to successfully obtain high Klout scores.
The lack of sybil-resilient influence measurement services
on Twitter can be detrimental. Specifically, there is a growing
market for influence measurement services with more than
20 service providers available [5]. If these service providers
fail to provide trustworthy measurement results due to sybil
attacks, they will have extreme difficulty getting customers
and surviving, and their customers could not achieve effective
information dissemination or acquisition as expected.
The root cause for the vulnerability of existing influence
measurement techniques to sybil attacks lies in the incautious
use of user interactions. Specifically, Twitter permits four types
of publicly visible user interactions, including follow, retweet,
reply, and mention. The interactions about any user can be
further classified into incoming interactions towards him and
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outgoing interactions from him. Since a sybil user can freely
follow, retweet, reply to, and mention other sybil or non-sybil
users, extensive outgoing interactions are fairly easy to create
and thus unsuitable for sybil-resilient influence measurement.
In addition, since sybil users could easily get many legitimate
followers [20]–[22], the number of followers each user has
should also be ruled out. In contrast, we observe from real
Twitter data that non-sybil users tend to be more selective
in retweeting, replying to, and mentioning other users. This
observation is in line with the real-life scenario: one may
exchange business cards with many strangers but will be more
cautious in choosing whom to further interact with. This means
that incoming retweets, replies, and mentions are much more
trustworthy information for measuring user influence. Existing
influence measurement techniques, however, use all incoming
and outgoing interactions in a non-discriminative way.
We propose TrueTop, a novel sybil-resilient influence mea-
surement system based on the incoming retweets, replies, and
mentions each Twitter user has. TrueTop provides on-demand
influence measurement services to various customers such as
business companies and government agencies. Given a target
set of Twitter users (e.g., those in a geographic area of interest),
TrueTop outputs a ranked list of top-K influential users for a
desirable integer K ≥ 1. TrueTop is designed to be sybil-
resilient and also accurate, which means that the TrueTop
output contains bounded sybil users and the true top-K non-
sybil users with overwhelming probability, respectively.
The main design challenge for TrueTop is that sybil users
can arbitrarily interact among themselves, so it is not sybil-
resilient to evaluate a user’s influence directly based on his
total incoming retweets, replies, and mentions. We propose
the following method to tackle this challenge. Given the target
set of users, we first construct a weighted directed interaction
graph, in which every vertex corresponds to a unique user
in the target set. An edge from vertex a to vertex b exists
if user a has ever retweeted, replied to, or mentioned user b,
and the edge weight is proportional to the number of retweets,
replies, and mentions from a to b. Imagine that the interaction
graph consists of a virtual non-sybil region with all non-sybil
users and a virtual sybil region with all sybil users. Given our
previous observations, both the number of edges and the total
edge weights from the non-sybil region to the sybil region
should be much smaller than those in the reverse direction.
Then we seed some carefully chosen vertices (or users) in the
non-sybil region with some credits and let every vertex in the
whole graph allocate its current credits to its direct successors
proportionally to the corresponding edge weights in every
iteration. After sufficient iterations, the top-K influential non-
sybil users are very likely to stand out, as they can accumulate
many credits due to their abundant incoming retweets, replies,
and mentions. In contrast, the total credits flowing into the
sybil region can be very limited, so even the sybil users with
many incoming interactions from sybil followers may end up
with few credits. We can thus achieve sybil-resilient influence
measurement by counting the final credits at every vertex.
This paper makes the following contributions.
• We motivate and formulate the problem of sybil-resilient
influence measurements on Twitter.
• We propose TrueTop, a novel influence measurement
system that can identify the top-K influential users in
a target set of Twitter users with high accuracy in the
presence of sybil attacks by exploiting the selectivity of
non-sybil users in interacting with other users.
• We confirm the high accuracy and sybil-resilience of
TrueTop by detailed theoretical analysis and extensive
experiments on real datasets.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
surveys the related work. Section III introduces Twitter basics,
our system and threat models, and our design objectives.
Section IV illustrates the TrueTop design. Section V theoret-
ically analyzes the accuracy and sybil resilience of TrueTop.
Section VI evaluates the performance of TrueTop by detailed
experiments. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There is significant effort to explore social networks for
effective sybil defenses in various distributed systems, such as
SybilGuard [23] and SybilLimit [24] for P2P networks, SumUp
[25] for online voting systems, and SybilInfer [26], SybilDe-
fense [27], and SybilRank [28] for online social networks. A
common assumption is that each node can be mapped into
one in an undirected social network graph where every edge
corresponds to a human-established trust relation. Although the
attacker can create many sybil accounts, he cannot establish an
arbitrarily large number of social trust relations with non-sybil
users. Moreover, all schemes assume that the honest region is
fast mixing and separate from the sybil region. Built upon these
two key insights, these schemes conduct varying community
detection methods [29] to limit the number of sybil users
admitted into or their impact in various application scenarios.
Recent measurement studies have questioned these two
assumptions. Yang et al. [30] showed that sybil users on the
Facebook-like Renren network can have their friend requests
accepted by many non-sybil users. A similar result targeting
Facebook was reported in [31]. Blending sybil users into the
non-sybil community would reduce the effectiveness of the
existing sybil defenses [32]. In addition, the work in [6], [15],
[19], [20], [33] showed that sybil users successfully acquired
a number of followings from non-sybil users on Twitter. All
these findings indicate that neither bidirectional friendships in
Fackbook-like OSNs nor unidirectional followings in Twitter-
like microblogging systems can be used as the trustable mir-
roring of real social relations. Moreover, it has been shown in
[34], [35] that the mixing time of many practical and directed
social graphs is much longer than previously expected. Since
neither of the two key assumptions underlying the schemes in
[23]–[29] holds in directed networks such as Twitter, they are
not directly applicable to our targeted scenario. Our TrueTop
system does not rely on either assumption.
As a special kind of sybil users, spammers in Twitter has
attracted considerable attention in recent years. A common
approach adopted by existing work [8]–[13], [36], [37] is
to detect spammers by measuring the behavioral difference
between spammers and legitimate users. Spammers are a
special type of sybil users, and the detection of general sybil
users on Twitter remains an open challenge.
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There is a rich literature for influence measurement on
Twitter. Cha et al. [1] found that the numbers of retweets and
mentions serve as better metrics than the number of followers
in measuring user influence. Bakshy et al. [4] proposed to
measure user influence based on his ability to post the tweets
that generates a cascade of retweets. TwitterRank [3] combines
link structure and topical similarity between Twitter users
and uses a modified PageRank algorithm to calculate user
influence. Pal and Counts [38] also proposed a framework
to identify topical authorities in microblogging systems. All
these schemes are vulnerable to sybil users who can forge
arbitrary information employed by these schemes for influence
measurement. Moreover, many metrics used by these schemes
have been incorporated into commercial influence measure-
ment tools [5], and the vulnerability of representative tools to
sybil attacks has been experimentally verified in [15].
Also related is the research on modelling, measuring, and
analyzing the interactions in OSNs, e.g., [39]–[43]. Our work
is the first to build a weighted directed interaction graph from
historical incoming retweets, replies, and mentions on Twitter
and use it for identifying influential users.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Twitter Basics
We illustrate the basic operations on Twitter to help un-
derstand our design. The social relationships on Twitter are
unidirectional by users following others. If user A follows user
B, A is B’s follower, and B is A’s followee. A user usually
needs no prior consent from his followees. Twitter also allows
each user to approve/deny every following request, but this
option is relatively rarely used. A user can send text-based
messages of up to 140 characters, known as tweets, which
can be read by all his followers. Tweets can be visible to
anyone with or without a Twitter account, and they can also be
protected and are only visible to approved followers. There are
three special kinds of tweets corresponding to three operations.
A retweet is a re-posting of someone else’s tweet, a reply
corresponds to a response to a tweet, and a mention refers to
inserting “@username” in a tweet to ensure that the specified
user can see this tweet. Finally, each user has a timeline which
shows all the latest tweets (including original tweets, retweets,
replies, and mentions) of his followees. Also note that Twitter
allows direct messages to be sent between users. Since those
direct messages are not publicly visible, they cannot be used
to measure user influence.
B. System Model
TrueTop is run by a service provider (SP) offering on-
demand influence measurement services to customers such as
viral marketers, government/military agencies, or even indi-
viduals. Given a measurement request, the TrueTop SP first
determines the target set of Twitter users to evaluate, denoted
by U . The users in U can be directly given by the customer
or identified by the TrueTop SP according to some common
features specified by the customer. For example, the customer
can specify a target geographic region, a target age group,
a target topic (e.g., music), etc. As said, TrueTop relies on
incoming interactions among the users in U , i.e., the retweets,
replies, and mentions each user in U has received from all the
other users in U . So we assume that the SP has a reliable way
to obtain the incoming interaction data needed, e.g., directly
from Twitter, via crawling, or from some third-party providers
of social media data. For example, Gnip (http://gnip.com/)
is an authorized reseller of Twitter data. TrueTop is designed
to output a ranked list of top-K influential users in U , where
K ≥ 1 denotes a customer-specified integer.
C. Threat Model
Let U˜ denote all possible sybil users in U . We assume that
the SP knows neither which user in U is a sybil user nor
how many sybil users there are; otherwise, the identified sybil
users can be simply removed from U . Based on the recent
measurement study [20], we assume that each sybil user may
have followed and also been followed by some non-sybil and
sybil users in U . There may be a single attacker controlling
U˜ or multiple independent ones with each controlling an
exclusive subset of U˜ . TrueTop can deal with both cases
without modification, so we focus on the more challenging
former case hereafter. The goal of the attacker is to gain high
influence scores for his sybil users and maximize the number
of users in the TrueTop output.
D. Design Objectives
Let U∗K and UK denote the top-K non-sybil influential users
in U and the TrueTop output, respectively. We have two major
design objectives.
• Accuracy: TrueTop should identify the true top-K non-
sybil users, which means the difference between U∗K andUK should be very small.
• Sybil resilience: TrueTop should not identify sybil users
as top-K users, i.e., the the intersection UK ∩ U˜ should
be very small.
IV. TRUETOP DESIGN
A. Overview
TrueTop is motivated by the observation that incoming
retweets, replies, and mentions are more trustworthy for mea-
suring user influence than outgoing interactions. So our first
step is to construct an interaction graph, in which every vertex
corresponds to a unique user in the target set U , and every
directed edge indicates totally non-zero retweets, replies, and
mentions from the tail user to the head user. In addition, the
weight of every edge is a non-decreasing function of related
retweets, replies, and mentions.
The next step is to choose a suitable metric to quantify
the influence of every user (vertex) in the interaction graph.
TrueTop adopts weighted eigenvector centrality (WEC for
short) [44], the de facto metric for measuring the influence
of a node in a weighted directed graph. Specifically, the WEC
score of every user corresponds to his influence score, which
depends on the weights of his incoming edges, the number
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of his direct predecessors, and their influence scores which
are further determined by their respective incoming edges and
direct predecessors. The WEC score reflects an intuition that
the influence of a user is better indicated by the interactions
from influential users than those from less influential users.
We uses iterative credit distribution for the convenience to
describe and understand our method. Specifically, we select
some random users (called seeds) in the interaction graph and
seed each with some credits. In each iteration, we allocate
all the credits each user receives in the last iteration to his
direct successors proportionally to individual edge weights.
The credits each user receives in one iteration are expected
to stabilize after sufficient iterations and be proportional to
his WEC score. It can be easily shown that iterative credit
distribution is equivalent to power iteration [45], a standard
technique for computing WEC scores. Since sybil users can
create arbitrary interactions among themselves, some of them
may gain enough credits to appear in the top-K list. TrueTop
achieves high sybil resilience by carefully choosing the initial
seeds and also early terminating iterative credit distribution.
In what follows, we first illustrate the construction of
the interaction graph in Section IV-B. Next, we present an
iterative credit distribution scheme over the interaction graph
in Section IV-C. Finally, we introduce how to achieve sybil-
resilient iterative credit distribution in Section IV-D.
B. Interaction Graph Construction
Given the target users U and their interaction data, TrueTop
first builds a weighted directed interaction graph denoted by
G = 〈U ,V〉, where U is abused to denote the vertex set, and
every edge vi,j ∈ V (i, j ∈ U) is directed and indicates that
there are some retweets, replies, and/or mentions from user i
to j. The major challenge here is to determine the weight wi,j
of every edge vi,j . As shown in Fig. 1, G can be divided into a
virtual sybil region S including all the sybil users and a virtual
non-sybil regionH including all the non-sybil users. The sybil-
resilience requirement for TrueTop requires that the sum of the
edge weights from the non-sybil region to the sybil region is
small, while the accuracy requirement for TrueTop demands
that the weight wi,j reflects the true influence of user j on i
in the target period. Let Ii,j denote the set of time-indexed
retweets, replies, and mentions from user i to j. We consider
the following two methods for defining the edge weights.
• Sum-based. In this method, wi,j equals |Ii,j |. Sum-based
edge weights satisfy the sybil-resilient requirement, as
the total edge weights from the non-sybil region to the
sybil region are as limited as the number of retweets,
replies, and mentions from non-sybil users to sybil users.
They also partially satisfy the accuracy requirement, as
the more interactions from i to j, the more influence
j likely has on i, and the higher wi,j . Sum-based
edge weights, however, fail to catch the temporal aspect
of interactions. For example, consider another direct
predecessor of j, say l, where |Ii,j | = |Il,j |. Assume
that the interactions in Il,j occurred in the last few
days in the target period, while those in Ii,j were
spread more evenly. It may be natural to say that j has
stronger influence on user i than on user l, but we have
wi,j = wl,j for sum-based methods.
• Entropy-based. In this method, we divide the target
period into µ equal-length epochs for some system pa-
rameter µ ≥ 1 and denote the total number of retweets,
replies, and mentions from user i to j in epoch xth by
dx, where |Ii,j | =
∑µ
x=1 dx. Then we define the edge
weight wi,j = (1−
∑µ
x=1
dx
|Ii,j | log
dx
|Ii,j | )|Ii,j |. The more
consistent the interactions from i to j in time, the higher
wi,j , and vice versa. When all the interactions happen
in a single epoch, the weight is identical to sum-based
|Ii,j |. Entropy-based edge weights can also satisfy the
sybil-resilience requirement, as non-sybil users unlikely
have consistent interactions to sybil users so that the
total edge weight from the non-sybil region to the sybil
region can be expectedly small. In contrast to sum-based
edge weights, entropy-based edge weights successfully
catch the temporal information in the interactions while
failing to reflect the volume of the interactions. So they
partially satisfy the accuracy requirement as well.
The effects of the above methods are compared in Section VI.
There may be other ways to define the edge weights. For
example, we can let wi,j equal a linear combination of the
edge weights derived under sum-based and entropy methods,
respectively; we can also assign different weights to retweets,
replies, and mentions according to slightly different effort
and/or social implication related to performing these interac-
tions. A further study on such issues is left as future work due
to space constraints.
Note that we only consider retweets, replies, and mentions
in the weight definitions because they are representative on
Twitter and have been used in all the existing influence
measurement techniques. Some other factors could also impact
the user influence, such as following connections and favorites.
As stated before, since sybil users could easily get many
legitimate followers [20]–[22], the following connections fail
to achieve the sybil resilience and hence should be ruled out
for the influence measurement. On Twitter, a user could favor
the tweets from other users, but there is no public Twitter API
which can return the favorite user list for any given tweet.
Should a public Twitter API for retrieving favorites become
available, we can easily incorporate favorites into TrueTop.
C. Credit Distribution
TrueTop uses the WEC score of every user in G = 〈U ,V〉 as
his influence score. Specifically, let pii denote the WEC score
of user i in G and W = (wi,j) denote the normalized weighted
adjacency matrix of G. The vector pi = 〈pi1, pi2, . . . , pi|U|〉 is the
dominant eigenvector of W, i.e., the solution to the equation
piW = pi according to [44].
Power iteration [45] is a common technique to compute the
WEC vector pi. Let v0 be a random vector composed of |U|
nonnegative elements totalling one. In power iteration, pi is
computed in an iterative fashion as
pi = lim
t→∞x
(t) = lim
t→∞v0W
t , (1)
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where x(t) = x(t−1)W with the initial x(0) = v0. If G
is strongly connected, pi exists, is unique, and is unrelated
to v0. In practice, power iteration normally terminates if
‖x(t) − x(t−1)‖1 < ν for some acceptable error threshold ν
(e.g., 10−9).
The WEC vector only exists in a strongly connected graph
[44], in which every vertex is reachable from every other
vertex. Although G itself may be not strongly connected in
practice, it usually has a giant strongly connected component
(GSCC) which includes the majority of the vertexes and edges
and is dramatically larger than all other strongly connected
components (SCCs). Since the most influential users should
have intensive interactions with other users, the top-K in-
fluential users should be in the GSCC with overwhelming
probability. Our subsequent operations thus apply to the GSCC
only. The verification of the existence of GSCC in real datasets
is deferred to Section VI.
TrueTop uses iterative credit distribution instead to compute
pi to facilitate the presentation. Initially, we randomly select a
few users (called seeds) in G and initialize each with the same
number of notional credits totalling one. At every iteration, we
allocate the credits each user receives in the last iteration to
his direct successors proportionally to the corresponding edge
weights. Let C(t)j denote the number of credits at any user
j ∈ U after t iterations, which are proportional to his influence
score measured after t iterations. C(t)j is a real number in
general and can be computed as
C
(t)
j =
∑
i∈IN(j)
wi,jC
(t−1)
i∑
k∈OUT(i) wi,k
, (2)
where IN(j) and OUT(i) denote the direct predecessors of
user j and the direct successors of user i in G, respec-
tively. Similarly, we can terminate credit distribution when∑
j∈U |C(t)j −C(t−1)j | < η for some acceptable error threshold
η (e.g., 10−9).
We can easily show that iterative credit distribution above
is equivalent to power iteration. In particular, assume that s
seeds are chosen in iterative credit distribution, each having
1/s credits initially. We further select v0 for power iteration
such that the ith element equals 1/s if user i is a seed and
zero otherwise. Then Eq. (2) is apparently the element-wise
expression of x(t) = x(t−1)W. Since power iteration does not
depend on a specific v0, we have x
(t)
j = C
(t)
j for any user
j ∈ U after t iterations.
Iterative credit distribution described above is still subject to
sybil attacks. To see this, consider Fig. 1 where the interaction
graph is divided into a virtual non-sybil region H and a virtual
sybil region S . We denote the total edge weights within H,
within S, from H to S, and from S to H by WH, WS , αWH,
and βWS , respectively, where α 1. Although the adversary
has no control over WH and α, he can easily manipulate WS
and β to make βWS very small. Even if all the seeds are
chosen from H in the best scenario, more and more credits
will flow into and stay in S as time goes by. We have the
following proposition about the vulnerability of iterative credit
distribution to sybil attacks.
Sybil RegionNon-sybil Region
Fig. 1: The interaction graph with a virtual non-sybil region
H and a virtual sybil region S.
Proposition 1. Assume that the total edge weights from the
non-sybil region H to the sybil region S and from S to H
are α and β fractions of the total edge weights in H and S ,
respectively. The total credits in S increase monotonically with
the iteration t and asymptotically approach to αα+β .
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in Appendix I-
A. Since the adversary can well control the topology within
S, most credits in S can go to a few sybil users who may
eventually appear in the top-K influential users.
D. Sybil-Resilient Credit Distribution
TrueTop adopts the following two defenses against sybil
attacks such that most credits can stay in the non-sybil region
for sufficient iterations.
The first defense is to use non-sybil seeds only so that credit
distribution can start from the non-sybil region H. We propose
to use verified Twitter users as seeds by three reasons. First,
Twitter has certified their authenticity. Each verified user has
a blue verified badge on his profile page and is followed by
the official Twitter account @verified. Second, there are many
verified users available as candidate seeds. As of April 2014,
Twitter has verified more than 88,600 accounts among 255
million monthly active users and keeps verifying more. Since G
can be expected to contain many users in practice, there should
be at least one verified user in G with very high probability.
Finally, since verified users are usually public figures such as
politicians, celebrities, or business leaders, we can trust them
to be very cautious in whom to retweet, reply to, and mention.
This implies that the immediate successors of verified users on
the interaction graph G are very likely to be non-sybil users
as well, so are the successors’ immediate successors. If we
start credit distribution from verified users, most credits can
be expected to stay inside H after many iterations.
How many seeds should we choose? Some verified users
may be very close to the sybil region, but we cannot tell who
they are. Ideally speaking, we should choose the verified users
far from the sybil region. On the one hand, if a verified user is
randomly chosen as the sole seed, he may be too close to the
sybil region. On the other hand, if we use all the verified users
in G as the seeds, it is very likely that some of them are close
to the sybil region. In addition, the number of seeds affects the
convergence of iterative credit distribution: the more seeds, the
faster the algorithm converges. It is impossible to specify the
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decisive rules for seed selection, so we randomly choose s ≥ 1
seeds from the verified users in G and experimentally evaluate
the impact of seed selection in Section VI.
How should we assign the initial credits among the s seeds?
We propose two methods as follows.
• Basic method. The total credits are evenly assigned to the
s seeds. This straightforward method assumes that each
seed has the same importance for credit distribution.
• Reverse-WEC. Since the credits flow out from the seeds,
we can assign more initial credits to the seeds who can
quickly reach more users to speed up the algorithm
convergence. For this purpose, we conduct the credit
distribution introduced in Section IV-C over an inverse
interaction graph generated from G by reversing the
directions of all the edges and also setting all the
edge weights to one. The final credits at each user
naturally reflects his connectivity in G. So we select
the verified users with the top-K highest credits as the
seeds and then assign to each of them the initial credits
proportional to their credits obtained via reverse credit
distribution.
The second defense is to early terminate iterative credit
distribution before it converges in the whole graph G. To see
the necessity and intuition for this defense, recall that we
start credit distribution from non-sybil seeds in the non-sybil
region. Since the total edge weight from the non-sybil region
to the sybil region is relatively small, we can expect credit
distribution to converge much faster in the non-sybil region
than in the whole G. In addition, the most influential non-
sybil users normally have many incoming interactions and thus
a rich number of credit sources in G. So they can quickly
accumulate a lot of credits to stand out much faster than
other non-sybil users. If we early terminate iterative credit
distribution, most or all of the sybil users would not get enough
credits to appear in the resulting top-K influential users, so
we can achieve sybil resilience. However, if credit distribution
stops too early, some true top-K influential non-sybil users
may not get enough credits to be ranked in the top-K list,
leading to an inaccurate result.
We design a simple but effective algorithm to tackle the
dilemma between sybil resilience and accuracy. The key idea is
to monitor the ranking change of the candidate top-K users in
two consecutive iterations. Whenever the ranking change is no
larger than an acceptable threshold, we terminate the algorithm
and output the current top-K users as the top-K influential
users. This algorithm is directly built on our observation above.
Specifically, since the top-K non-sybil influential users is more
likely to stand out much faster than both sybil users and other
non-sybil users during credit distribution, their rankings are
more likely to become stable in fewer iterations as well. We
detail the algorithm as follows and postpone its performance
analysis to Section V.
Let r(t)(u) and r(t−1)(u) denote the rankings of user u
in iterations t and t − 1, respectively. We define the ranking
distance d(K)(t) between R(t) and R(t−1) as
d(K)(t) =
∑
u∈R(t)(K)∪R(t−1)(K)
|r(t)(u)− r(t−1)(u)| . (3)
Algorithm 1: Find the top-K influential users
input : Interaction graph G; s seed users; K; maximum
number of iterations T ; ranking-error tolerance 
output: The top-K influential users
Assign initial credits among s seed users by either basic
or reverse-WEC method;
t← 1;
while t < T do
Distribute the credit in the t-th iteration according to
Eq. 2;
Rank the users by their credits and obtain the
candidate top-K users R(t);
Compute the ranking distance d(K)(t) between R(t)
and R(t−1) as in Eq. 3;
if d(K)(t) <=  then
break;
t← t+ 1;
return R(t) as the top-K influential users
The algorithm above has two key parameters: T and .
The former dictates the maximum number of iterations, and
the latter specifies the maximum ranking error tolerance. The
larger T , the longer the algorithm execution time, the more
accurate the top-K influential users, the more credits flowing
into the sybil region and thus the less sybil resilience, and
vice versa. In contrast, the larger , the shorter the algorithm
execution time, the less accurate the top-K influential users,
the fewer credits flowing into the sybil region and thus the
higher sybil resilience, and vice versa. In practice, we can let
 < K, meaning that each user in the current top-K list has
experienced a ranking change of less than one on average in
contrast to the previous iteration.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the accuracy and sybil resilience
of TrueTop. Recall that U∗K denotes the true top-K influential
users in the non-sybil region, UK denotes the TrueTop output
(i.e., the output of Alg. 1), and U˜ denotes all the sybil users in
the sybil region. So we can use UK∩U∗K and UK∩U˜ to measure
the accuracy and sybil-resilience of TrueTop, respectively.
To make the performance analysis tractable, we first assume
that Alg. 1 runs in the non-sybil region only, so we can conduct
an upper-bound analysis about the accuracy of TrueTop by
setting the ranking error tolerance parameter  = 0 and T
extremely large such that Alg. 1 terminates only when a stable
top-K user list is found. We then show that Alg. 1 will
terminate in asymptotically the same number of iterations for
 = 0, based on which we finally estimate the number of
sybil users appearing in UK . As stated before, the larger , the
shorter the algorithm execution time, the less accurate the top-
K influential users, the fewer credits flowing into the sybil
region and thus the higher sybil resilience, and vice versa.
Hence by setting  = 0, we can provide the lower and upper
bounds for sybil resilience and accuracy, respectively. As for
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arbitrary  > 0, we unfortunately cannot obtain the closed-
form analytical result for sybil resilience or accuracy and thus
resort to experiments to evaluate its impact in Section VI.
The following concepts are needed for the accuracy analysis.
Definition 1 ((Relative) Error Bound). Let pi denote the true
WEC vector of non-sybil users and the k-ranked user refer
to the one with the kth highest WEC score τk in pi. Let τ
(t)
k
denote the WEC score of the k-ranked user after iteration t.
Then e(t)k = |τ (t)k − τk| is defined as the error bound for the
k-ranked node after iteration t, and e′(t)k = e
(t)
k /τk is defined
as the relative error bound.
Definition 2 ((Relative) WEC gap). The WEC gap for the k-
ranked node is defined as ∆k = τk − τk+1, and ∆′k = ∆k/τk
is the correspondingly relative WEC gap.
Lemma 1. Let W denote the normalized weighted adjacency
matrix of the non-sybil region with n users, among which there
are s seed users. Construct v0 for power iteration (see Eq. 1)
such that the ith element equals 1/s if user i is a seed and
zero otherwise. Then the relative error bound for the k-ranked
user satisfies e′(t)k ≤ λt, where λ < 1 denotes W’s second
largest eigenvalue.
Lemma 1 states that the rank of each user in iteration t
approaches its true rank for sufficiently large t. The proof of
Lemma 1 can be found in Appendix I-B.
In addition, Ghoshal and Barabasi [46] recently found that
if the WEC vector (Pagerank in their paper) follows power
law distribution, the gap between the kth and (k+ 1)th WEC
scores decreases with k. We thus have the following lemma.
Lemma 2. [46] If the WEC vector pi follows a power-law
distribution with parameter γ, the relative WEC gap for the
k-ranked user satisfies ∆′k ≈ 1k(γ−1) .
The proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward according to [46]
and omitted here due to space constraints. In Section VI, we
show that the WEC vectors for real Twitter datasets indeed
follow the power-law distribution. We then have the following
theorem based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Theorem 1. For iterative credit distribution in a strongly-
connected weighted directed graph with the monotone-
decreasing ∆′k with k, if λ
t ≤ ∆′k/2 in iteration t, the ranked
list of users with top-k credits remain the same in subsequent
iterations.
The proof is in Appendix I-C. Theorem 1 indicates that if
there are no sybil users, Alg. 1 (or TrueTop) can generate the
true top-K influential non-sybil users if λt ≤ ∆′K/2, i.e., when
t ≤ − log(2K(γ − 1))/ log(λ) or t = O(| log(K)/ log(λ)|)
iterations. This also corresponds to the case of  = 0 with
100% accuracy. Since the total edge weights from/to the non-
sybil region to/from the sybil region are relatively very small,
we can expect that the sybil region has little impact on the
influence rankings of non-sybil users. So the accuracy of
TrueTop under sybil attacks is tightly related to how many
sybil users can show up in the top-K list, i.e., the sybil-
resilience of TrueTop, as analyzed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let α be the ratio of the total edge weight from the
non-sybil region to the sybil region over the total edge weights
in the non-sybil region. Assume that the attacker wants to place
as many sybils into the top-K list as possible by retaining
all the credits flowing into the sybil region. The number of
sybil users in the top-K list after early termination in t =
O(log(K)/ log(λ)) iterations is upper-bounded by K(1−(1−
α)t)/(1− α)t.
The proof is in Appendix I-D. Accordingly, we can easily
derive the lower bound for the accuracy of TrueTop because
there are at least K(2−1/(1−α)t) true top-K non-sybil users
in the final top-K list. Note that since α 1 and K is usually
at the scale of 1,000 and 10,000, this upper bound is far less
than K, meaning that there are only negligible sybil users in
the top-K list.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we thoroughly evaluate the performance of
TrueTop. We first introduce some implementation details and
the runtime performance, followed by the datasets used in our
evaluations. Next, we verify two underlying assumptions in our
design. Finally, we evaluate the accuracy and sybil resilience
of TrueTop under various sybil attacks.
A. Implementation and Runtime Performance
TrueTop is composed of two main components: the interac-
tion graph construction and the credit distribution with early
termination. We implemented both with a total of 2000+ lines
of mixed code of Python and C++. Specifically, to efficiently
handle the large-scale interaction networks (millions of nodes
and billions of edges) in a commodity PC, we adopted the
Graphchi computing framework [47] to implement the credit
distribution of TrueTop. On our desktop with 3.4GHz Intel-i7
3770 CPU, 16G Memory, a 7200RPM hard disk, and Ubuntu
12.04 LTS, one single iteration of credit distribution took
0.3s, 2.5s, 9.2s, and 17.1s for our four datasets in Table I
with 4K, 10K, 1M and 2M nodes, respectively. For a graph
with 2M nodes, TrueTop can thus find the top-1000 influential
users after 1,000 iterations within less than five hours on
a commodity PC. Since TrueTop is expected to be run by
a service provider with much more powerful computation
resources, its runtime performance should be acceptable.
B. Datasets
We crawled four representative datasets with public Twitter
APIs. The SF and TS datasets include all the active users who
have specified San Francisco Bay Area and Tucson, Arizona
in the location field of their public profiles in the crawling (or
target) period, respectively. In addition, the Random dataset
contains a random set of active Twitter users in the target
period, and the Music dataset contains the active users who
have used the keyword “music” in their tweets in the target
period. Each dataset includes all the user IDs and also their
time-indexed tweets during the target period, which include
original tweets, retweets, replies, and mentions. Then we
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TABLE I: Dataset Characteristics.
SF TS Random Music
Crawling period 8/30-11/30, 2013 6/28-9/28, 2013
# of users 176,506 5,827 1,999,834 999,807
# of edges 1,493,924 40,031 63,803,204 34,688854
# of users in GSCC 104,000(58.9%) 4,127(70.8%) 1,541,343 (77.1%) 687,693 (68.9%)
# of edges in GSCC 1,305,834(87.4%) 36,189 (90.4%) 55,781,520 (87.4%) 30,170,774(87.0%)
# of users in the 2nd largest SCC 357 6 82 21
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Fig. 2: The distribution of WEC values.
constructed two interaction graphs for each dataset according
to the process in Section IV-B, one for sum-based edge weights
and the other for entropy-based edge weights.
Table I summarizes the basic statistics of the interaction
graphs of each dataset, which apply to both sum-based and
entropy-based edge weights. As we can see, each interaction
graph has a giant strongly connected component (GSCC)
which is far larger than the second largest SCC. Since TrueTop
measures user influence based on incoming interactions, the
top-K influential users are in the GSCC with overwhelming
probability. Our subsequent evaluations are thus done on the
GSCC in each interaction graph only. We obtained very similar
evaluation results for sum-based and entropy-based interaction
graphs. Due to space limitations, we report the results for sum-
based interaction graphs in most cases.
C. Feasibility Studies
1) WEC Value Characteristics: TrueTop bases its early
termination of iterative credit distribution on two assumptions.
First, the WEC values of non-sybil nodes follow a power-law
distribution. Second, the relative WEC gap ∆′k decreases as k
increases. Now we verify these two assumptions.
Fig. 2 shows the log-log CCDF of the WEC values. We can
see that all the CCDF curves are close to straight lines with
the slopes from -2 to -1 for the WEC values larger than 10−6.
Since a power-law distribution with PDF p(x) = (γ − 1)x−γ
has a CCDF F¯ (x) = x1−γ , the WEC values of each interaction
graph follow a power-law distribution with parameter γ from
2 to 3.
Fig. 3 shows the log-log scale of ∆′k as a function of k,
where the results are shown up to k = 105 due to space
constraints. We computed the WEC values by using ν = 10−4
as the error tolerance threshold of power iterations, which
led to about 1,000 iterations. ∆′k obviously decreases with an
approximate slope of -1 in the log-log scale, which coincides
well with the analysis in Lemma 2.
2) Interaction Analysis: Since there is no benchmark for
the real-world sybils on Twitter, we designed an experiment
to estimate the total edge weight from the non-sybil region to
the sybil region in order to verify that it is relatively very
small. To catch the growing intelligence of Twitter sybils,
we adopted the behavior of the emerging social bots [6],
[15], [19]. Our experiment run as follows. We first purchased
1000 Twitter accounts, then divided them to mimic legitimate
activities as in [15], [19], and finally investigated how many
legitimate users will follow or interact with them. Specifically,
we divided these 1000 accounts into five groups of equal
size, each corresponding to a unique activity among following,
tweeting, retweeting, mentioning, and replying. We ran the
experiment for 30 days. In each day, we let each sybil user in
each group initiate 10 activities corresponding to that group.
For example, each sybil user in the Following group followed
10 randomly-chosen new users in each dataset every day.
Except the sybil users in the Tweeting group, the sybil users in
all the other groups initiated the corresponding activities only
towards randomly chosen new users in each dataset. We also
recorded the total followings/mentions/retweets/replies every
sybil group received each day. In addition, we chose the
Random, SF, and Music datasets as the target datasets in
the first 14, middle 8, and last 8 days, respectively.
Fig. 4 shows the incoming-outgoing (I-O) ratios of each
sybil group, which is defined as the number of total follow-
ings/mentions/retweets/replies each sybil group received every
day over the total number of interactions initialized from the
sybil group in the same day (i.e., 2,000). We have two obser-
vations. First, non-sybil users are very careful about whom to
interact with and rarely interact with sybil users. Second, sybil
users can get a non-trivial number of non-sybil followers. We
manually found that most non-sybil followers are normal users
out of reciprocity, social capitalists, or even spam accounts
not suspended by Twitter, and this observation is in line with
prior results in [20], [21]. So incoming followings are less
trustworthy for evaluating user influence than incoming replies,
mentions, and retweets.
To compute the I-O ratios of the sybil and non-sybil com-
munities, we randomly chose 30 groups of 200 users from each
of Random, SF, and Music datasets. We then recorded the
incoming and outgoing interactions of each non-sybil group
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Fig. 3: Relative WEC gap ∆′k.
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Fig. 4: Incoming-outgoing ratios for sybil groups, where the same legend is used in all the figures.
TABLE II: The comparison of incoming-outgoing ratios be-
tween sybil and non-sybil communities under sum-based and
entropy-based interaction graphs.
Graph Model Community SF Random Music
Sum Non-sybil 0.89 1.04 0.70Sybil 0.08 0.08 0.08
Entropy Non-sybil 1.54 1.15 0.60Sybil 0.04 0.07 0.05
every day in the same experimental period. The I-O ratio
for each sybil or non-sybil group is redefined as the total
incoming edge weight over the total outgoing edge weight.
Table II compares the average I-O ratios of the sybil and
non-sybil groups for both sum-based and entropy-based edge
weights. As we can see, non-sybil communities always have
much higher I-O ratios (i.e., much more balanced incoming
and outgoing interactions) than sybil communities. Moreover,
the entropy-based weight model yields lower and higher I-
O ratios than the sum-based weight model for the sybil and
non-sybil communities, respectively. We thus expect that the
entropy-based weight model can lead to better sybil resilience
than the sum-based model (as shown in Table III).
D. Accuracy and Sybil Resilience Studies
1) Evaluation Methodologies: Since large-scale real experi-
ments on Twitter inevitably violate the Twitter ToS, we resort
to synthetic simulations to evaluate the accuracy and sybil re-
silience of TrueTop. We used all the four datasets and obtained
quite consistent results. Below we show the evaluation results
for the SF dataset only due to space constraints.
We modelled the strength of sybil attacks on Twitter by a
parameter α, which refers to the ratio of the total edge weight
in the non-sybil region over that from the non-sybil region
to the sybil region. The default value of α, denoted by α∗, is
obtained from our datasets as follows. Assume that the network
is composed of a non-sybil region with n1 twitterers and a
sybil region with n2 twitterers. According to our experiments,
we found that about 0.98‰ of the users in the SF dataset
have been suspended, so we set n1 = 1000n2. Moreover,
assume that each non-sybil user initiate one interaction (i.e.,
retweeting, mentioning, or replying) to each of the other
n1 − 1 users, leading to n1(n1 − 1) outgoing interactions.
According to Table II, the average I-O ratio of the non-
sybil community for the sum-based interaction network is
(0.89+1.04+0.7)/3 ≈ 0.88. Therefore, the n1 non-sybil users
can receive about 1.88n1(n1 − 1) ≈ 1.88n21 incoming and
outgoing interactions. Similarly, the sybil users issue totally
n2n1 interactions to the non-sybil region and receive about
0.08n2n1 interactions from non-sybil users. We thus have the
following approximation
α∗ =
0.08n2n1
1.88n21
=≈ 4.2 ∗ 10−5. (4)
We used the following method to simulate the sybil region,
which has been adopted in [23], [28]. Given the interaction
graph constructed from the SF dataset, we can expect that the
majority of the 104,000 users there are non-sybil users, but
we cannot tell which users are sybil or non-sybil users. So
we manually attached to the original interaction graph a sybil
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region which is a complete digraph of 500 sybil users and ran
TrueTop over this augmented interaction graph. We assume the
worst-case scenario in which the attacker aims to retain all the
credits flowing into the sybil region, so there is no interaction
from the sybil region to the non-sybil region. We then added
wg random links of weight one from the non-sybil region to
the sybil region, which is equivalent to assuming that there
are wg accidental one-time interactions from non-sybil users
to sybil users. wg varied from 10 to 200 in our experiments.
Since the total edge weight of the original interaction graph
is about 106, we effectively simulated the parameter α from
10−5 to 2× 10−4. To simplify the presentation, we equate wg
with α and call it the attack strength as well hereafter.
We considered three strategies for the attacker to add the
wg links. In the random attack, the attacker randomly selects
wg users in the non-sybil region and adds a link of weight one
from each to a randomly chosen user in the sybil region. In the
community attack, the attacker performs a breadth-first search
from a random user in the non-sybil region until wg users
are found, and it adds a link from each discovered user to a
random user in the sybil region. In the seed attack, we fixed
10 seed users in the non-sybil region and assumed that the
attacker knows all of them. The attacker performed a breadth-
first search from the 10 seed users and randomly chose wg
users closest to any of the 10 seed users. It finally adds a
link of weight one from each of them to a random user in
the sybil region. Obviously, the seed attack corresponds to the
strongest attack. We conducted 50 experiments for each attack
and report the average result below. In addition, we chose 100
verified users as seed users in all simulations.
Now we introduce some metrics to measure the accuracy
and sybil resilience. Recall that UK , U∗K , and U˜ denote the
TrueTop output, the true top-K influential users in the non-
sybil region, and all the sybil users, respectively. We obtained
U∗K by running power iteration over the non-sybil region only
with the error tolerance ν = 10−8. We measure the accuracy
of TrueTop by comparing UK and U∗K via the following two
types of errors.
• Type-I error: d(K)/K, where d(K) is the distance
between UK and U∗K and computed according to Eq. (3).
The metric measures the average rank offset of U∗K fromUK .
• Type-II error: (K − |U∗K ∩ UK |). This metric measures
how many true top-K users are missed by TrueTop.
The sybil resilience of TrueTop is inversely proportional to
#sybil = |U˜ ∩UK |. After iterative credit distribution in TrueTop
terminates, assumes that totally C credits are retained in the
sybil region. Let C1, . . . , CK denote the credits of the top-K
influential users in the non-sybil region in a non-decreasing
order. Also assume that the attacker tries to maximize #sybil
by arbitrarily manipulating the topology of the sybil region
such that the C credits can flow into a few sybil users. We
can derive #sybil as follows:
#sybil =
{
0 if C < CK ,
argmax
1≤x≤K
C ≥ xCK+1−x else.
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Fig. 5: TrueTop performance under different attack strengths
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Fig. 6: TrueTop performance for different Ks.
2) Basic Results: Fig. 5 shows the performance of TrueTop
under different attack strengths in random and community
attacks. In this experiment, we set K = 100 and  = 0. As
the attack strength increases from 10 to 200, the type-I error is
flat with less than one, and the type-II error is below two, both
showing the high accuracy of TrueTop under different attack
strengths. Moreover, the number of top-100 sybil users, i.e.,
#sybil, slowly increases as wg increases, which is as expected.
#sybil, however, stays below four for both attacks. In addition,
larger wg is likely to increase the number of iterations and
thus make the top-K list more accurate. So we can see that
the type-II error overall decreases with increasing wg .
Fig. 6 shows the performance of TrueTop under different
Ks in random and community attacks. In this experiment, we
set the wg = 100 and  = 0. We also normalized #sybil by
K. Although #sybil/K slowly increases with K due to more
iterations, it is always less than 6%. In addition, both type-I
and type-II errors are always less than two, indicating the high
accuracy of TrueTop.
Fig. 7 shows the performance of TrueTop under different
s in random and community attacks. In this experiment, we
set wg = 100 and K = 100. As expected, the larger the
error tolerance , the larger both type-I and type-II errors.
In contrast, #sybil decreases with increasing  due to fewer
iterations towards credit distribution termination.
Fig. 8 shows the performance of TrueTop under seed attacks
for both sum-based and entropy-based edge weights. In this
experiment, we set K = 100 and  = 0. In addition, we
randomly selected wg users from d = 3, 000 immediate
successors of 10 random seed users, from which wg links of
weight one were added to the sybil region. We can have three
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TABLE III: The impact of different design options on TrueTop performance.
Random attack Community attack Seed attack
Seed selection: basic vs. rwec 0.11 0.232 -0.017 -0.03 -0.19 -0.192 0.11 0.19 0.316
Edge weights:sum vs. entropy 0.07 -0.002 0.226 0.08 0.00 0.572 -0.071 0.327 0.871
# of seeds: 10 vs. 100 4.26 0.099 0.122 2.89 0.121 0.078 3.66 0.136 2.8
Type-I Type-II #sybil Type-I Type-II #sybil Type-I Type-II #sybil
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Fig. 9: Comparing TrueTop with Kred, Pagerank and WEC
with power iteration under the random and community attacks.
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Fig. 7: TrueTop performance under different s.
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Fig. 8: Impact of seed attacks with different weight models.
observations from Fig. 8. First, TrueTop is still very accurate as
both type-I and type-II errors are always less than 2. Second,
seed attacks can yield more sybil users in the top-K list than
both random and community attacks. Finally, entropy-based
edge weights enable stronger sybil resilience than sum-based
edge weights, as the former can dramatically increase the total
edge weight in the non-sybil region in contrast to the total
edge weight from the non-sybil region to the sybil region. An
effective defense against the seed attack is deferred to Fig. 11.
Table III shows the impact of design choices on the TrueTop
performance. In this set of experiments, we set K = 100,
 = 0, wg from 10 to 200, and d = 3, 000 for the seed
attack. We compared the basic and reverse-WEC methods
for seed selection, sum-based and entropy-based methods for
determining edge weights, and also 10 versus 100 seed users.
For simplicity, we added up the type-I errors, type-II errors,
and #sybil values under different attack strengths for each
design choice, respectively. For each pair of design choices, we
subtracted the sum of the second choice from that of the first
one for the type-I error, type-II error, and #sybil, respectively.
Since most results in Table III are positive, it is clear that
the second choice in each pair can achieve higher accuracy
and sybil resilience in most cases. Specifically, as expected,
the entropy-based weight model yields better sybil resilience
performance than the sum-based model.
3) Comparison with Other Methods: We compare our algo-
rithm with the following methods.
1) Kred [17]. Since Kred has publish its influence score
algorithm on http : / / kred . com / rules, we select it as
the benchmark mechanism. Kred only computes the
influence score by how many interactions a user have
received in the past 1,000 days. During our 90-days
experiment, we let each of the 500 sybils retweet each
other sybil once per day. Therefore, each sybil receives
44,910 interactions from the sybils in the end. We will
see that this conservative attack is sufficient for filling
the top-K list with mostly sybils.
2) Pagerank [48]. One may think about using the Pagerank
value of each user in the interaction graph to evaluate
his influence. Modified power iteration with non-zero
reset probability is commonly used to compute Pager-
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ank values. We set the rest probability to 0.15.
3) WEC by power iteration. This method corresponds to
TrueTop without early termination.
Fig. 9 compares the number of top-100 sybils of TrueTop
with those of Kred, Pagerank and WEC by power iteration.
As we can see, TrueTop allows less than 4 sybil users in the
top-100 list under both random and community attacks. By
comparison, the sybils in Kred can easily occupy 99 positions
of the top-100 list. We also expect they will occupy all the
top-100 positions if more interactions between the sybils were
conducted. This is because the sybils can obtain unlimited
incoming interactions from other sybils. Under WEC with
power iteration, sybil users can occupy a significant portion
in the top-100 list, as a lot more credits flow into and stay in
the sybil region when power iteration terminates in contrast
to TrueTop. In addition, Pagerank leads to more top-100 sybil
users than TrueTop and is less sensitive to the attack strength
than WEC with power iteration. However, if we increase the
number of sybil users from 500 to 1,000 without changing
the attack strength, the top-100 sybil users under Pagerank
will increase. This is because the more sybil users, the higher
probability that credit distribution jumps to the sybil region
due to resetting operations, the higher Pagerank values of some
sybil users. So Pagerank is not sybil-resilient either, which is
consistent with [49]. In contrast, both TrueTop and WEC with
power iteration are insensitive to the size of the sybil region.
Since WEC with power iteration is equivalent to seed-based
iterative credit distribution without early termination, we also
compare it with TrueTop with regard to the resilience to the
seed attack. Note that Pagerank is not vulnerable to the seed
attack because it does not use any seed user. Fig. 10 compares
the top-100 sybil users of the two methods under the seed
attack, where the number of immediate successors of the 10
victim seed users varies from d = 5000 to 10, 000 for the fixed
attack strength wg = 100. As we can see, both methods yield
more top-100 sybil users as d increases under sum-based and
also entropy-based edge weights. This result is quite intuitive:
the smaller d, the fewer nodes sharing the initial credits from
the seed users, the more credits flowing into the sybil region
over the wg links, and vice versa.
An effective defense again the seed attack is to select
more seed users and/or choose the verified users with more
immediate successors as seed users. The efficacy of this
defense is shown in Fig. 11. In this experiment, we assume
that the attacker picked up 10 random seed users and then
randomly selected d immediate successors of them for adding
the wg links to the sybil region. We varied the number of
seeds from 10 to 800 for each value of d. As we can see,
we can dramatically improve the resilience of TrueTop to the
seed attack by increasing both the number of seed users and
the number of immediate successors of the seed users.
4) Remarks: We have three remarks on the performance
evaluation above. First, our evaluation results demonstrate the
lower-bound performance of TrueTop. Specifically, we adopted
a very strong attacker model by assuming that the attacker
withholds all the credits flowing into the sybil region by having
zero interactions to the non-sybil region. In practice, sybil
users often try to initiate interactions with non-sybil users for
other purposes such as spamming and phishing than merely
aiming to gain high influence scores. Therefore, we can expect
fewer credits to stay in the sybil region than under our attacker
model such that TrueTop shall have higher accuracy and sybil
resilience in more practical settings. Second, we admit that our
evaluations are not complete given so many design choices
for TrueTop as shown in Table III and many possible attack
strategies. We have only shown some important results here
as the examples and expect similar results for other design
choices and attack strategies. Finally, we modelled the sybil
behavior in accordance with prior work [6], [15], [19]. There
are more advanced sybil attacks such as astroturfing [33]
which could attract more legitimate interactions from non-
sybil users. Unfortunately, there is no efficient way to simulate
such advanced sybil attacks on a large scale. Instead, we use
high attack strength wg to model them in the experiment.
As expected, TrueTop performs worse for higher wg but still
shows better performance in contrast to other methods. The
performance of TrueTop will certainly degrade if the sybils
could completely mimic the behavior of legitimate users, but
manipulating the sybils to behave so intelligently will involve
huge adversarial effort. TrueTop can thus significantly raise the
bar for attacks on influence measurement.
VII. CONCLUSION
Influential users are vital to accelerate large-scale informa-
tion dissemination and acquisition on Twitter. In this paper, we
presented TrueTop, the first sybil-resilient system to measure
the influence of Twitter users to the best of our knowledge. Our
theoretical studies and also performance evaluations confirmed
the high accuracy and sybil resilience of TrueTop.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: Let the total credits in H and S at t-th iteration be
C
(t)
H and C
(t)
S , respectively. According to the credit distribution
defined in Eq. 2, after the t-th iteration, the average credits
flowed from H to S and S to H are αC(t)H and βC(t)S ,
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respectively. Meanwhile, the total credits in the whole network
is constant to 1. Hence,
C
(t)
H = (1− α)C(t−1)H + βC(t−1)S
= (1− α)C(t−1)H + β(1− C(t−1)H )
= (1− α− β)C(t−1)H + β
= (1− α− β)t−1C(1)H + ((1− α− β)t−2 + . . .+ 1)β
= (
1
α+ β
− 1)α(1− α− β)t−1 + β
α+ β
and
C
(t)
S = 1− C(t)H = (1−
1
α+ β
)α(1− α− β)t−1 + α
α+ β
Since α 1 and β  1, C(t)H will decrease monotonically and
C
(t)
S will increase monotonically. When t→∞, C(t)S = αα+β .
B. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: According to the Perron-Frobenius theory [50],
the matrix W is irreducible and has the largest eigenvalue
of 1, and all other eigenvalues are absolutely less than 1,
denoted as 1 = λ1 > λ2 ≥ λ3 ≥ . . . ≥ λn > −1.
Moreover, if we denote the corresponding n eigenvectors as
v1,v2, . . . ,vn, then |v1| = 1 and we denote v1 as the WEC
vector pi. Next if W is diagonalizable, then v1,v2, . . . ,vn can
be orthogonal to expand the whole space of Rn. For the case
of non-diagonalizable W, we can use the Jordan canonical
form to transform it into a diagonalizable one [51].
Since v1,v2,v3, . . . ,vn are orthogonal, v0 can be written
as
v0 =
n∑
i=1
aivi (5)
where ai ∈ R. We argue that if W is stochastic and irreducible
then a1 = 1. To see why, we first notice that since W is
stochastic, W1 = 1. It follows that vTi W1 = λiv
T
i 1 = v
T
i 1.
The eigenvector corresponding to λ1 is the stationary distri-
bution of Markov Chain W. Since W is irreducible, λi < 1
and λi 6= 1 when i 6= 1. Thus we can see that vTi 1 = 0 for
i 6= 1. Multiplying 1 at both sides of Eq. 5, it follows that
v01 = a1v11. Since both v0 and v1 are non-negative vectors
with the sum of 1, we have a1 = 1.
Thus Eq. 5 can be simplified as
v0 = v1 +
n∑
i=2
aivi = pi +
n∑
i=2
aivi .
Multiplying Wt at both sides and keeping using the equa-
tion viW = λiW, we can obtain
x(t) = v0W
t = (pi +
n∑
i=2
aivi)W
t = pi +
n∑
i=2
λtiaivi .
Let λ = max(|λ2|, |λn|). As the t → ∞, λt will become
dominant and it follows that |(x(t) − pi)i| = O(λt)
Moreover, for j ∈ U \ s,∑ni=1 aivi,j = v0,j = 0. Hence,
e
(t)
j = |
n∑
i=2
λtiaivi,j | ≤ λt|
n∑
i=2
aivi,j | = λt| − v1,j | = λtpij .
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: The conclusion is composed of two parts. We begin
with the first part, i.e., if λt ≤ ∆′k/2 at the t-th iteration, then
x1 > x2 > . . . xk. Consider the k- and (k− 1)-ranked nodes.
Since the relative WEC gap ∆′k is monotone decreasing for k,
we have
e′k ≤ λt ≤ ∆′k/2 < ∆′k−1/2
Combined with e′k−1 ≤ λt in Lemma 1, we can get e′k−1 <
∆′k−1/2. In other words,{
ek = |xk − pik| ≤ ∆k/2,
ek−1 = |xk−1 − pik−1| < ∆k−1/2.
By several operations, we have
xk−1 − xk > ((pik−1 − pik)− (pik − pik+1))/2 > 0
which holds since ∆k/pik < ∆k−1/pik−1 < ∆k−1/pik. Simi-
larly, we can find that xk−2 > xk, . . . , x1 > xk. Moreover, if
starting from (k − 1)-ranked node (it holds as e′k−1 ≤ λt ≤
∆′k−1/2), we have xk−2 > xk−1, . . . , x1 > xk−1 and thus
x1 > x2 > . . . > xk.
Then we prove the second part, i.e., if λt ≤ ∆′k/2 at the t-th
iteration, then xk > xj , where j is from k+ 1 to n. Consider
the k- and (k + 1)-ranked nodes. We have{
ek+1 ≤ λtpik+1 < λtpik ≤ ∆k/2,
ek ≤ λtpik ≤ ∆k/2.
Hence,
xk+1 − xk < 0
and so for all other nodes with the rankings larger than k.
Since λt is geometrically decreasing for t, λt < ∆′k/2 holds
for all the following iterations and so does the conclusion.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: According to [46], the expected k-ranked WEC is
〈pi〉k ≈
Γ(k − 1γ−1 )
Γ(k)
According to Proposition 1, the number of credits for S after
the t-th iteration is given by:
C
(t)
S = 1− C(t)H = (1−
1
α+ β
)α(1− α− β)t−1 + α
α+ β
The maximum C(t)S can be obtained as 1 − (1 − α)t when
β → 0, i.e., the sybils conduct very limited interactions to the
non-sybil users. Moreover, since the attacker wants to place as
many sybils into the top-K list as possible, he can just divide
14
the total credits C(t)S by the k-ranked WEC value. Then the
number of sybils that own 〈pi〉K credits is given by
n(K) =
C
(t)
S
C
(t)
H 〈pi〉K
≈ 1− (1− α)
t
(1− α)t〈pi〉K
Here we further approximate the 〈pi〉K . For the power law
distribution, 2 ≤ γ < 3. Thus
Γ(k − 1γ−1 )
Γ(k)
>
Γ(k − 1)
Γ(k)
=
1
k
Hence, we can obtain n(K) < K(1− (1− α)t)/(1− α)t.
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